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A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES RAISED IN
THE FIREARMS SELLERS IMMUNITY BILL
Frank J. Vandall*
S.659 A BILL**
To prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued
against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or
ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by
others.
I. INTRODUCTION
Snipings, mass-murders by disgruntled employees, children
shooting children, and a vast number of spousal murders are everyday
news across the country. In the numerous lawsuits brought by
individual victims and over 30 cities, it has been alleged that gun
manufacturers and sellers have an important role to play in designing
guns to be safer and in closely monitoring gun sales. The courts are
weighing these issues and have dismissed a large number of individual
and city suits for various reasons. As the Senate debates the Bill (S.
659) that shields those in the gun trade from liability, several issues need
to be examined. These considerations suggest that complete immunity is
premature and the various gun liability cases should be permitted to
work their way through the judicial process. Part One examines the
collapse of the gun suits in the state courts. Part Two evaluates the gun
violence epidemic. Part Three considers critical gun control policies,
and Part Four weighs the judicial construction of the Second
Amendment.

*

Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; B.A., 1964, Washington and Jefferson
College; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin. I
appreciate the research assistance of Jennifer Joy Dickinson and Dana Stano. Mistakes are mine,
however.
**
S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003). The Bill may be found in Appendix A.
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A. Suits Against The Gun Manufacturers Are Foundering In The State
Courts
In Merrill v. Navegar, the California Court of Appeals held that
Navegar, the manufacturer of an automatic weapon known as the TEC-9,
should be held liable to the surviving families of the eight victims who
were murdered by an irate law firm client.1 The novel basis of the suit
was that Navegar negligently advertised and marketed the TEC-9 to
people who were likely to use it for criminal purposes.2 The court cited
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) data which found
“due to its unsurpassed firepower, concealability, and low price,” the
TEC-9 was a favorite among violent criminals.3 The BATF report stated
that the TEC models are used in one out of every five crimes involving
gun violence.4 Merrill had been heralded as a forward-looking decision
for gun responsibility.5 In August, 2001, the California Supreme Court
reversed Merrill v. Navegar on the basis that the negligence action
against Navegar fell within California Code Section 1714.4: “(a) In a
products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed
defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not
outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury,
damage, or death when discharged.”6 The court rejected the court of
appeals’ view that this section prohibited only a strict liability action and
ruled that Section 1714.4 also applied to a case sounding in negligence:
[M]ost of the evidentiary matters relevant to applying the risk/benefit
test in strict liability cases “are similar to the issues typically presented
in a negligent design case.” . . . This similarity is not surprising,
because to say that a product was “negligently designed” is to say it
“was defective, for purposes of establishing liability under a theory of
negligence. . . .” This similarity also is not accidental; over the years,
we have incorporated a number of negligence principles into the strict
liability doctrine, including Barker’s risk/benefit test. . . .

1. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d by Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2001), infra, note 6.
2. See id. at 155.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Frank J. Vandall, Economic and Causation Issues in City Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 719, at 726-27 (2001).
6. Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116, 133 (Cal. 2001). Section 1714.4 has since been repealed.
“The primary effects of Chapter 913 are to repeal Section 1714.4 and to amend . . . its provisions to
the design, distribution, and marketing of firearms and ammunition.” J. Fowler, Will a Repeal of
Gun Manufacturer Immunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary?, 34 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 339, 348 (2003).
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[T]his is a products liability action based on negligence, which asserts
that the TEC-9/DC9 was defective in design because the risks of
making it available to the general public outweighed the benefits of
that conduct, and that defendants knew or should have known this fact.
Plaintiffs may not avoid this conclusion, or the legislative policy
section 1714.4 reflects, simply by declining to use the word defect or
defective.7

The second important suit, against the gun manufacturers, to meet a
roadblock was Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.8 The foundation of Hamilton was
the theory that there was a negligent over-saturation of guns in the
southern states.9 As a result of this, guns were obtained by straw
purchases and transported to New York and Chicago, where they were
banned, and there sold on the black market.10 The plaintiffs claimed
“the manufacturers’ indiscriminate marketing and distribution practices
generated an underground market in handguns, providing youths and
violent criminals with easy access to the instruments they have used with
lethal effect.”11 The key to this suit was that the manufacturers of
handguns foresaw these saturation sales and encouraged them.12 The
jury found in favor of the victims and against the gun manufacturers.13
The plaintiffs claimed on a certified question that:
the jury could reasonably have concluded that in considering all the
circumstances – industry knowledge of widespread trafficking in new
handguns, heavy movement of guns from “weak law” to “strong law”
states and risks associated with criminals’ easy access to these
dangerous instruments – defendants were negligent in failing to take
appropriate steps to reduce the risk of their products’ being sold to
persons with a propensity to misuse them.14

The federal district court’s holding in Hamilton was seriously
undermined by the New York Court of Appeals.15 On a certified
question from the federal district court, the New York Court of Appeals
held that under New York law, no duty extended from the gun
manufacturers to the shooting victims because the connection was
7. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 125-26.
8. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001).
9. Id. at 835.
10. Id. at 808-09.
11. Id. at 808.
12. Id. at 827.
13. Id.
14. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802.
15. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001).
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“remote.”16 The Court reasoned:
The pool of possible plaintiffs is very large – potentially, any of the
thousands of victims of gun violence. Further, the connection between
defendants, the criminal wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running
through several links in a chain consisting of at least the manufacturer,
the federally licensed distributor or wholesaler, and the first retailer.
The chain most often includes numerous subsequent legal purchasers
or even a thief. Such broad liability, potentially encompassing all
gunshot crime victims, should not be imposed without a more tangible
showing that the defendants were a direct link in the causal chain that
resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries, and that the defendants were
realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs. Giving plaintiffs’
evidence the benefit of every favorable inference, they have not shown
that the gun used to harm plaintiff Fox came from a source amendable
to the exercise of any duty of care that plaintiffs would impose upon
defendant manufacturers.17

The third important challenge to the firearms industry was the more
than thirty suits by various cities including New Orleans, Atlanta, and
Chicago.18 Most of these suits have foundered. The goal of the
municipal suits was to recover the expenses paid by the cities in dealing
with gun violence.19 Several suits were dismissed on appeal for various

16. Id. at 1062.
17. Id.
18. See New York City Sues Gun Industry, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 20, 2000:
In October 1998, the Legal Action Project filed for the City of New Orleans the first
lawsuit ever brought by a governmental entity against the gun industry. Since that time,
cities and counties across the nation, including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles
and Philadelphia, have launched a legal attack on the gun industry to hold it accountable
for designing and distributing guns with no regard for public health and safety. The
Legal Action Project represents 25 out of the 32 cities and counties that have filed suit so
far.
Id. See also Bill Rankin, Ruling Jump-Starts Atlanta’s Gun Lawsuit, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 17, 2001, at 1A (reporting that the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the suit against gun
manufacturers was prematurely dismissed); Dan Horn & Spencer Hunt, City’s Firearms Lawsuit
Revived; Supreme Court of Ohio Agrees to Hear Case, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2001
(reporting that the Ohio Supreme Court will hear the city’s case previously dismissed by the lower
courts).
19. For example, the Chicago suit is asking for over 433 million dollars in damages for
primary and secondary costs associated with gun violence, including the costs of extra police,
medical costs, and welfare expenditures for surviving families. See Fox Butterfield, Chicago is
Suing Over Guns From Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1998, at A4. See also Roberto Suro, Suits
Against Guns Use Tobacco Model, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 24, 1998, at A1
(stating that the New Orleans suit seeks recovery for the city’s costs of “police protection,
emergency services, facilities and services, as well as lost tax revenues due to the gun
manufacturers’ products and actions”).
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reasons. Part of the Atlanta suit was dismissed because strict liability
was held not available to the city; the New Orleans case was dismissed
because “it improperly intruded on the state’s exclusive power to
regulate the firearms industry.”20 The Cincinnati suit was thrown out
because it “is an improper attempt to have [the] Court substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature.” Strict liability and negligent
design, as well as public nuisance and fraud claims, have been rejected.21
The recent victories by the gun manufacturers in both design defect and
damage to cities, suggest that widespread immunity is unnecessary at
this time.
II. THE UNITED STATES IS FACING A GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC
The United States is facing a large number of injuries and deaths
from firearms on a regular and continuing basis.22 Over 13,000 adults
and children died from gun related deaths in 1992.23 More Americans
were murdered with firearms in 1993 through 1994 than were killed in
8.5 years of combat in the Viet Nam war.24 The total of handgun deaths
in 1992 (13,220) “exceeds the combined total of Great Britain, Sweden,
20. Richmond Eustis, Gun Makers: Halt City Suit Until Georgia High Court Rules, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, August 10, 2001, at 1. Ed Anderson, Appeal Draws Fire From Foster;
Gunmakers Not Liable for Violence, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 2, 2001, at 1. The United States
Supreme Court has refused to review the dismissal of the New Orleans suit by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Alan Sayre, High Court Finishes Off N.O. Gun Suit, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.) Oct. 10, 2001, at 1-B.
21. Products Safety & Liability Reporter, Vol. 27, October 15, 1999 at 1003. Because the
injury to the city of Bridgeport was indirect, the Connecticut Supreme Court found in favor of the
gun manufacturers, ATLANTA J& CONST., October 2, 2001, at A9.
22. See generally Alan Clendenning, Security Didn’t Deter Gunfight Two Students
Hospitalized, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 27, 2000, A4 (reporting on a gunfight in a New Orleans
middle school between two students); 4 Teens Shot in 2d Seattle Weekend Attack, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Sept. 25, 2000, at A4 (“An assailant opened fire on a car carrying young people as it
stopped at a ride light in Seattle, critically wounding three of them.”); Sheila Edmundson & Ruma
Banerji, Disgruntled Worker Shoots 2, Turns Gun on Himself, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis, TN), June 29, 2000, at DS1 (“It’s kind of a situation that . . . was a wakeup call. . . . It
can happen anywhere. It’s not just limited to big cities.”); Melody McDonald, Lubbock Man Killed
Accidentally; Friend Mistakes 9mm Weapon for a BB gun, THE FORT WORTH STAR–TELEGRAM,
June 26, 2000, at Metro 2 (reporting on two men “wrestling around the living room when they both
ran for what they believed was the BB pistol on the mantel”); Lyda Longa, Boy Finds Gun, Kills 5Year-Old Brother, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 21, 1999, at 1A (“Minutes before the shooting,
Roshon, his brother, and three other youngsters had been playing with water pistols when they
found a loaded .380 semiautomatic handgun in a box stuffed with garbage.”); Bill Montgomery,
Road Rage: Needless Deaths, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 13, 2000, at A1 (reporting on a recent
death resulting from a confrontation between two drivers, one of which had a gun).
23. See Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 352, 354, n.33 (1997) (citing HANDGUN CONTROL INC., FIREARM FACTS (Jan. 1995)).
24. Id. at 354.
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Switzerland, Japan, Australia, and Canada by nearly 13,000 deaths.”25
Professor Zimring found an epidemic of gun violence among youths
aged 10-17.26 The violence is not uniformly distributed across society.
Instead black males die proportionately more than white males as a
result of gun violence.27
The gun immunity legislation glosses over the substantial risk of
being shot by non-criminals.28 There is an assumption that the risk of
gun violence comes solely from criminals,29 but a substantial percentage
of homicides are committed by non-criminals.30 Spouses and friends,
for example, are a common target of gun violence.31 In many cases, the
25. Id.
26. Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific
Epidemic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26 (1996) (“This essay is a brief examination of three
dimensions of the juvenile firearms use epidemic of the period since 1985.”).
27. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights”: A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 502 (1992) (citing the United States Department
of Justice Crime Statistics for the proposition that “[t]he number one cause of death for AfricanAmerican males between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is murder.”). Census Bureau statistics
bear this out as well. In 1996, black males died at a rate of 50.6 per 100,000 due to firearms; white
males died at a rate of 19 per 100,000. BUREAU OF CENSUS: DEATH AND DEATH RATES FOR INJURY
BY FIREARMS BY RACE AND SEX: 1980 TO 1996, tbl. 151, at 109 (1999). Further, a 1989 Public
Heath Report stated that an analysis of firearm deaths in California determined that “firearms were
the number one cause of death for black men ages 25 to 34 years and black women aged 15 to 24
years.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS,
104:111-120, at 4 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing Pediatric Injuries From
Firearms: Charting a Legislative and Regulatory Course, 88 PEDIATRICS 294, 300 (1991) (arguing
that “most shootings are not committed by felons . . . but are acts of passion that are committed
using a handgun that is owned for home protection.”); David Kairys, A Carnage in the Name of
Freedom, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 12, 1988, at A15 (“That gun in the closet to protect
against burglars will most likely be used to shoot a spouse in a moment of rage . . .”).
29. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1245 (1996) (“The homicide data collected over the past
thirty-five years have consistently shown that 70-80% of those charged with murder had prior adult
records, with an average adult criminal career of six or more years, including four major felony
arrests.”); Phillip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 63 (1995) (“An effective transfer-regulating scheme that prevents
guns from going to dangerous people would be nearly as successful as a much more intrusive
scheme targeted at current gun owners. Each new cohort of violent criminals must obtain guns
somewhere.”).
30. See infra note 31. However, Don B. Kates suggested in a private conversation with the
author that there are no shootings by persons without criminal records. Interview with Don B.
Kates in Chicago, Ill. (Fall 2002). See also D.B. Kates and D.D. Polsby, The Myth of the “Virgin
Killer,” Nov. 2000, on file with author.
31. A firearm in the home is forty-three times more likely to injure a member of the
household (whether a homicide, suicide, or unintentional shooting) than to injure an intruder. See
Arthur L. Kellerman & Donald Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths
in the Home, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1560 (1986). Further it is estimated that 150,000 cases of
domestic violence involve firearms, and that in these cases “death was twelve times as likely to
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shooter had no criminal record.32 Typical cases involve one spouse
shooting another, or friends who are shot while “playing” with a
firearm.33 Children are often victims of gun violence.34 A common fact
pattern involves a young child finding a gun in his or a family member’s
home and using it to shoot a playmate or a sibling.35
Some suggest that an individual will be safer with a gun in the
home, yet the facts point the other way. Dr. Arthur Kellerman found
that a person in a household with a gun is forty-three times more likely
to be shot than the intruder.36 Even if the high percentage of suicides is
removed from this statistic, it still means that a person with a gun or a
member of her family is much more likely to be shot than the intruder.37
A gun owner is more at risk of being shot than someone who does not
own a gun.38
Because of the large number of shootings, the nature of secondary
education is changing. In responding to concerns about gun violence,
public schools are spending millions of dollars to insure that no guns
occur.” Bassin, supra note 23, at 356.
32. See Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States, 12 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 243, 265-66 (1993) (“Gun control measures that are targeted solely at those with
criminal records fail to protect us from the most likely source of handgun murder: ordinary
citizens.”); see also HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CRIME OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94th Cong. 1774 (1975) (statement of Dee Helfgott, Coordinator, Coalition for Handgun
Control of Southern California, Inc.):
Most murders (seventy-three percent) are committed impulsively by previously law
abiding citizens during arguments with family members or acquaintances. . . . A readily
available gun is what turns an assault into a murder. The handgun, often kept in the
home for self-defense, is six times as likely to be used against a family member as it is to
be used against an intruder.
Id.
33. See supra notes 30-31.
34. See supra note 22, infra note 35.
35. Lyda Longa, Boy Finds Gun, Kills 5-Year-Old Brother, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 21,
1999, at 1A (“Minutes before the shooting, Roshon, his brother, and three other youngsters had been
playing with water pistols when they found a loaded .380 semiautomatic handgun in a box stuffed
with garbage.”).
36. See Kellerman & Reay, supra note 31, at 1559. But Professor Kleck argues that if
attacked, an armed individual will fare better than an unarmed one.
Gary Kleck’s analysis of 1979-85 national data in Point Blank shows the following
comparative rates of injury: only 12.1-17.4% of gun-armed victims resisting robbery or
assault were injured; 24.7-27.3% of victims who submitted were nevertheless injured;
40.1-48.9% of those who screamed were injured, as were 24.7-30.7% of those who tried
to reason with or threaten the attacker, and 25.5-34.9% of those who resisted.
Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment,
45 EMORY L. J. note 478 at 1259 (1996).
37. Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L. J. note 478 at 1259 (1996).
38. Id.
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will enter the schools.39 Public schools have erected fences, purchased
metal detectors, hired full-time guards, required the children to purchase
and carry see-through book bags, and conduct extensive locker
searches.40 Many schools now have zero tolerance for weapons.41
The problem is that the schools may become safe from firearm
violence, but the risk of children being shot will remain; the shooting
venue will shift from inside the school to outside the school.42 Children
will face the risk of being shot while off school property: on the street, in
their home or in a friend’s home.43 Gun dealers can be asked to exercise
39. Judy Mann, Unheeded Warnings, Tragic Endings, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 09,
2001, at C09 (“The sad truth is that no one can predict which troubled kid is going to start shooting
up his school. Millions of dollars have been spent in the last couple of years on safe-school
projects, including one in San Diego County, where the latest carnage occurred, and no clear pattern
has emerged.”).
40. See David C. Anderson, Curriculum, Culture and Community: The Challenge of School
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 317, 334 (1998) (noting that may schools use “hard security
measures” to counteract gun violence including searching lockers, closing the school during lunch,
use of security officers who routinely searched students, use of drug sniffing dogs, metal detectors,
and use of closed circuit television). Id. Anderson argues that more innovative approaches through
curriculum, the administration, and the community have had success. See David Hall, Shootings
Spotlight School Safety Proposal Seeks to Put Officers in All Michigan Schools, SOUTH BEND
TRIBUNE, May 3, 1999, at b6:
The school shooting in Littleton, Colo., has prompted one Michigan legislator to propose
police officers be posted in public schools . . . . He also suggested that one way to deal
with annual costs of the program would be to handle them jointly between the schools
and the police department.
Id. Ellen O’Brien, Deadly Acts Put Focus on Need for Prevention; Colorado School Killings/The
Threat of Violence, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1999, at A30 (discussing, in part, the use of metal
detectors, both stationary and hand held, in Boston schools); Mary Ellen Moore, School Security
Chiefs Deal with Guns, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Apr. 27, 1996, at 34 (“School
security staffs have become an integral part of public school systems, . . . and are often represented
at faculty meetings, PTA meetings and sporting events.”).
41. See Paul M. Bogos, “Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions.”—Michigan’s Zero—
Tolerance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DET. MERCY.
L. REV. 357, 374-76, n.118 (1997). Under Michigan’s program, a student found possessing a
weapon on school grounds is permanently expelled from all schools in the state and no alternative
educational program is provided. Id. at 359. The zero tolerance standard has created its own set of
problems, however, because the application of the standard can lead to ridiculous results. In 1995, a
twelve-year old boy was expelled for turning in a gun brought to school by another student. See
Zero Tolerance Proves to Be a Little Ridiculous in Knawha, CHARLSTON GAZETTE & DAILY
MAILING, Dec. 8, 1995, at 4A.
42. This is especially true in areas where the school is part of an already unsafe neighborhood.
See Anderson, supra note 40, at 328. Based on a “reanalysis of the Safe School Study data,” it was
determined that “neighborhood social conditions [are] . . . an important predictor of disorder within
schools, along with school size and resources, organization of instruction, and school climate and
discipline.” Id.
43. See Thomas J. Walsh, The Limits and Possibilities of Gun Control, 23 CAP. U. L. REV.
639, 641 (1994) (recounting incidents of youth gun violence and victimization including the injury
of a seven year old boy who was in his home and was wounded by a stray bullet from a gunfight in
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more care in order to make certain that guns do not reach children. Gun
manufacturers can be asked to design guns that cannot be operated by
children.44
III. AN ANALYSIS OF GUN CONTROL AND LIABILITY POLICY
This section will evaluate the foundational issues surrounding gun
control and liability. Clear answers to these fundamental questions are
needed before sweeping immunity is imposed.
A. Self Protection
Many issues surrounding the use of firearms for self-protection are
unresolved. Scott Jacobs argues that the cost of guns does not exceed
the benefit.
In contrast with the 500,000 violent crimes and 15,377 firearms related
homicides committed in the United States during 1992, only 308 cases
were classified as justifiable homicide by a private citizen using a
firearm in self defense against a felonious perpetrator. . . . the statistics
do not account for those instances where the defending citizen was
injured or killed while attempting armed self defense.45

In contrast David Kopel and Scott Little argue that “there is copious
evidence that a significant number of crimes are deterred every year by
gun wielding Americans . . . . Studies of prison inmates confirm that
criminals are deterred when they believe that their potential victims are
armed.”46
Arguably the possession of a gun in the home presents a risk to
every member of the family.47 Dr. Arthur Kellerman found that, when
there was a gun in the home, it was much more likely that someone in
the home, father, mother, one of the children or a guest, would be shot
other than an intruder.48 Newspaper accounts of gun use are disturbing:
the street; a child killed on the way to the zoo; a young man killed when “some young men across
the street from his house opened fire”).
44. A basic reason for tort liability is to ask the defendant to exercise reasonable care.
Perhaps a gun manufacturer could design a child-proof handgun.
45. Scott Jacobs, Note, Toward A More Reasonable Approach to Gun Control: Canada as a
Model, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 336 (1995) (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 1992, tbl. 2.16 (1994)).
46. Davis B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns:
Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REV. 504-506 (1997).
47. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48. Id. See also Anthony Spangler, 62-Year-Old Accidentally Shoots Himself, Grandson, THE
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a spouse comes home unexpectedly at night, and is shot and killed;49
family members get into an argument and one is shot;50 a child finds a
gun and shoots his mother, father, sibling, or a playmate;51 or a young
child is injured while playing with a gun.52 Women, especially, are at
risk when there is a gun in the house.53 The substantial risk to the
members of the gun owners’ family must therefore be weighed against
the slight risk of dying at the hands of an armed criminal, before
immunity is granted.54

FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 11, 2000, at 3 (where a man accidentally shot himself and his
11-year-old grandson when the gun discharged while cleaning it).
49. See, e.g., Woods Cross Man Shoots Pregnant Wife By Accident, THE DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), Mar. 1, 2001, at B03 (where a man shot his pregnant wife believing she was an
intruder).
50. See, e.g., Sarah Antonacci, Police Say Man Killed Wife, Turned Gun On Self; Couple
From Buffalo Were Married 11 Years, THE STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), Sept. 12,
2000, at 1 (where an argument over their impending separation apparently led a man to kill his wife
and then turn the gun on himself).
51. See, e.g., Gun Play: Game of Life and Death, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 15, 1999, at
8A (where a twelve-year-old boy fatally fired his mother’s gun at his friend’s back, believing that
the gun was unloaded).
52. See, e.g., Beth Warren, Police Probing Case of Girl, 4, Killed by Gun, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 23, 2000, at 1JJ (where a four-year-old girl spotted her aunt’s gun on a shelf, bounced
on the bed high enough to reach it, and fatally shot herself).
53. See, e.g., Max B. Baker, Crimes Against Women Targeted, THE FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Jan. 12, 2001, at 1 (recounting an incident in which a man came home to find his wife
in the kitchen with another man, shooting her 6 times in a moment of “sudden passion”);
Christopher Goffard, Household Conflict Ends in Shootings, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999,
at 1 (where a man came into the kitchen and shot his wife and niece after a history of domestic
conflicts); Ryan Frank, Cooper Mountain Man Indicted in Wife’s Killing, THE OREGONIAN, Nov.
15, 2000, at B02 (where a man shot his wife in the kitchen of their home the morning after the
couple decided she should move out); John Marzulli, Mary Engels, Austin Fenner & Henri E.
Cauvin, S.I. Cop Kills Wife, Self, DAILY NEWS (New York, NY), Oct. 21, 1998, at 3 (where a police
officer shot his wife then himself in the kitchen of their home).
54. Dixon, supra note 32, at 277-78:
Taking handguns from law-abiding citizens does not deprive them of many methods of
self-defense. They still have the option of escaping or calling for help, using weapons
other than handguns, using their bare hands, reasoning with the criminal, or simply not
resisting. . . . It is possible that in some cases a victim would be able to avoid theft,
injury, or even death had she been armed with a handgun. This “cost” of my proposal
needs to be weighed against the likely negative results of the defensive use of handguns
described above: unnecessary and excessive use of handguns in self-defense; and the
deaths shown by Kellerman and Reay to result from the abuse of handguns in the home.
Id. See also id. at 282:
Whatever protection would be lost by disarming the small number of women who
currently own handguns is outweighed by the reduction in all violence against women
that would be affected by a handgun ban, which would take one of the most potent
weapons out of the hands of many potential assaulters.
Id.
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B. Enforce Existing Gun Control Laws
Gun advocates suggest that, rather than enacting more laws limiting
the ownership and sale of guns, the federal government should enforce
existing laws.55 They argue that penalties should be stiffened for
criminals who commit crimes with guns.56 For example, the National
Rifle Association (NRA) advocates Project Exile, where every convicted
felon apprehended with a gun or committing a crime with a gun will go
to prison for five years.57
The assumption is that gun sales and ownership is heavily
regulated. Section 2(3) of the Bill finds, for example, that “The
manufacturers . . . of firearms and ammunition . . . are heavily regulated
by Federal, State, and local laws.”58 In fact there are few meaningful
gun regulations.59 This was shown quite clearly in the recent New York
suit, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,60 which had as its foundation the theory that
there was an over-saturation of guns in the South. Because of this, they

55. Wayne LaPierre, 2000 NRA Annual Meeting of Members (May 20, 2000), available at
http://www.narhq.org/transcripts/wlpam.shtml (“If the issue is making our streets safer from gun
crime, prosecution is the answer. If the issue is making our kids safer from gun accidents, education
is the answer. If the issue is making our schools safer, then parenting and mentoring is the
answer.”). See also Charlton Heston, Truth and Consequences (Apr. 16, 1999) available at
http://www.nrahq.org/transcripts/yale.asp:
[T]he Clinton Administration is not prosecuting violations of federal gun law. In fact,
they reversed the Bush Administration’s policy of prosecuting felons with guns. Instead,
with plea bargains, a wink and a nod, they’ve been letting armed felons off the hook.
From 1992 to 1998, prosecutions have been cut almost in half. . . . Passing laws is what
keeps politicians’ careers alive. Enforcing laws is what keeps you alive. But nobody’s
getting arrested, nobody’s going to jail, it’s all a giant scam. It’s not real life. It’s a big
lie.
Id.
56. Bob Dart & Scott S. Greengerger, High Noon for Gun Control Fight: Mother’s Day
March Spotlights Safety Issue, and Politicians Rush to Offer Solutions, Court Votes, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 13, 2000, at A1 (“In general, [Governor, now President] Bush argues that the best gun
control policy is to enforce existing laws and stiffen penalties for criminals who commit crimes with
guns.”).
57. Heston, supra note 55
Project Exile simply enforces existing federal law. Project Exile means every convicted
felon caught with a gun, no matter what he’s doing, will go to prison for five years. No
parole, no early releases, no discussion, period. . . . Project Exile, in its first year in
Richmond, cut gun homicides by 62 percent. And as you’d expect, related gun crimes
like robbery, rape and assault also plummeted. That means hundreds of people in
Richmond today are alive and intact who, without Project Exile, would be dead or
bleeding. For years the NRA has demanded that Project Exile be deployed nationwide.
Id.
58. See The Brady Bill, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000); Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
59. The Brady Bill, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
60. 62. F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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were purchased and transported to New York and Chicago, where they
were banned, and sold on the black market.61 If guns had been regulated
in a meaningful way, they would not have been sold beyond saturation
in the South and would not have made their way into the hands of
violent criminals in New York and Chicago.62 Gun immunity will
provide a stamp of approval on sales that exceed the saturation point.
Existing gun regulations leave gaps large enough to permit 7.5
million gun sales per year.63 The teen shooters in the past several years
obtained their guns from parents, friends, or at gun shows.64 None of the
teens had meaningful criminal records and obtaining guns was
apparently effortless.65
There are only a few meaningful limitations on the sale of guns:
one is the ban on automatic weapons66 and another is the ban on sales of
guns to known criminals.67 The errors, fueled by gun advocates, are that
Americans have only criminals to fear and that citizens are safe in their
homes as long as they have a gun.68 The reality is that the average
61. The plaintiffs claimed that “the manufacturers’ indiscriminate marketing and distribution
practices generated an underground market in handguns, providing youths and violent criminals
with easy access to the instruments they have used with lethal effect.” Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at
808.
62. Suggestions for regulation included:
(1) requiring distributors to sell only to stocking gun dealers, i.e., retailers who stock
guns for sale from legitimate retail outlets, (2) prohibiting sales at gun shows, where
widespread unrecorded and unsupervised sales to nonresponsible persons were said to
take place, and (3) analyzing trace requests to locate retailers who disproportionately
serve as crime gun sources, and cutting off distributors who do business with them.
Id. at 831.
63. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 58 (1995).
64. Butterfield, supra note 19.
65. See Gary Harmon, Pain of Columbine Still Lives, COX NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 15, 2000
(statement of Dr. Bob Sammons, a Grand Junction psychiatrist). “The Columbine killers had
criminal records, but their lawbreaking wasn’t of the frequency or extremity that would suggest the
destruction they actually caused.” Id. See also Butterfield, supra note 19.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver — (4) to any person any
destructive device, machinegun. . . short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as
specifically authorized by the Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity.”).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2000):
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or
ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
person — (1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance . . . .
Id.
68. For a strong rebuttal argument, see Kairys, supra note 28, at 4:
The more handguns there are, the more people see them as necessary for self-defense.
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citizen is much more at risk from their spouses, friends, and children
with guns than they are from criminals.69
The Brady Bill is often mentioned in discussions and was passed
for the purpose of reducing gun sales to criminals and certain other
classes of citizens.70 It does not prevent the sale or purchase of guns by
law-abiding citizens.71 The Brady Bill merely provides for a short
waiting period72 and a prohibition of purchases by criminals.73 It
requires background checks to see if the purchaser has a criminal
record.74 Recent studies suggest that the Brady Bill has been effective in
prohibiting the purchase of guns by approximately 500,000 criminals.75
The Brady Bill did not prevent the Columbine and the District of
Columbia sniper shooters from obtaining the guns they needed,
however.

Their spread is very much an epidemic, carried by fear rather than a virus. It is an
unusual epidemic in that the cause is widely seen as the cure, as fear breeds more fear
and guns create demand for more guns . . . .
Id. See also Dixon, supra note 32, at 275:
[I]t is in response to the proliferation of handguns that an increasing number of people
believe they need to buy a handgun for self-defense. . . . [W]hile some potential
criminals may be deterred by a heavily-armed citizenry, others will arm themselves with
more and more powerful firearms in order to outgun resisters. Trading gunfire or
playing chicken with increasingly heavily-armed criminals is a tenuous basis for the
defense of society.
Id.
69. See Kellerman & Reay, supra note 31, at 1559:
Guns kept in King County homes were involved in the deaths of friends or acquaintances
12 times as often as in those of strangers. Even after the exclusion of firearm-related
suicides, guns kept at home were involved in the death of a member of the household 18
times more often than in the death of a stranger.
Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 922(c) (2000).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2000):
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or
ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
person — (1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance. . . .
Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (2000).
75. President William Clinton, Democratic National Convention (Aug. 14, 2000) (“We put
100,000 new police officers in every street, virtually, in every community throughout these United
States. We stopped the manufacture of 19 specific kinds of assault weapons, and we have prevented
a half-million felons, fugitives and domestic abusers from buying guns, because of the Brady
Bill.”).
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C. Personal Responsibility
Gun immunity proponents suggest that the key to gun liability is
personal responsibility.76 Their foundational position is that only the
shooter should be held liable and not the gun dealer or the gun
manufacturer.77 This is the essence of the immunity legislation. The
problem with this argument is that it sets up a strawman.78 Almost all
criminals are judgment proof.79 If they aren’t before the shooting, they
are after the shooting because their assets have gone to pay their
attorney.80 Young children and teen shooters are judgment proof
because they have no assets.81 Indeed if we assume that the value of a
life today is one million dollars, then practically all shooters are
judgment proof.82 Complete immunity for firearms sellers argues that
this million dollar loss must always remain on the shoulders of the
innocent victim and their families, and that the gun industry must be
excused from responsibility. Under the immunity bill, the families of
the victims of the District of Columbia sniper will have no legal
recourse.

76. See Heston, supra note 54 (“If you say guns create carnage, I would answer that you
know better. Declining morals, disintegrating families, vacillating political leadership, an eroding
criminal justice system and social morals that blur right and wrong are to blame — certainly more
than any legally owned firearm.”).
77. Heston, supra note 55 (“When . . . gunmakers are responsible for criminals’ acts . . .
something is wrong.”). See also NRA-ILA Research & Information Division, “Junk Lawsuits”
Against
Gun
Manufacturers
(visited
July
13,
2000),
available
at
http://nraila.org/research/19990825-LawsuitPreemption-001.shtml (“In all these suits the plaintiffs
seek to wipe out centuries-old tort law principle . . . . Defendants can’t be held liable for injuries
that occur only because a properly operating product is criminally or negligently misused.”).
78. The strawman insulates the manufacturer from liability: if the manufacturer is not held
liable and the perpetrator is judgment-proof, no one bears the responsibility for the harm caused by
the firearm. See Kairys, supra note 28, at 7-8 (“This structure, which the manufacturers have
created, also provides them with a deceptive deniability: they can claim that they have no
responsibility for whatever occurs after they sell to the wholesalers, which hides their lack of even
minimal safeguards or concern for the public or costs to the cities.”).
79. Phillip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy: An Economic Analysis
of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 96 (1996) (arguing that a system of ex
post liability poses difficult problems with collecting a judgment equal to the amount of injury to
the victim).
80. While imprisonment may be an alternate form of a fine, there is no guarantee that such
punishment will be a sufficient deterrent to the perpetrator in the heat of passion. See id. at 96-97.
81. Id. at 105 (“[M]ost youthful criminals, even those who sell drugs occasionally, have small
incomes.”). The situation is further complicated because youths may behave irrationally, choosing
to risk the punishment even when it is contrary to their best interests.
82. Id. at 98 (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, Strategic and Ethical Issues in the Valuation of Life,
STRATEGY AND CHOICE 380 (1992) (estimating the value of life to be between $1 million and $10
million)).
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D. Economic Impact
The argument for gun ownership as a means of self-defense needs
to be evaluated in terms of micro-economic theory.83 The benefits from
gun ownership must exceed the costs of such ownership in order to be
economically efficient. More than 15,000 deaths each year and directly
related losses strongly suggest that the costs of gun ownership today
substantially exceed the benefits. The suits brought by the cities and
shooting victims argue that the costs of gun violence should be shifted
to the gun manufacturers. The expenses being paid by the cities and the
taxpayers are enormous: “[the] medical costs of treating the gunshot
injuries received during 1994 in the United States was $2.3 billion.”84 In
view of the substantial risks to the homeowner and the family when
there is a gun in the home, the alleged benefits from firearm ownership
for self-defense are suspect. If there are approximately 15,000 firearm
homicides each year (costs),85 and keeping a gun in the home prevents
308 deaths from attackers (benefits),86 then if we assume that each life is
worth one million dollars,87 the costs of gun violence ($15 billion)
exceed the benefits ($308 million) by more than 14 billion dollars each
year.88 Immunity leaves this huge loss on the victim and society.
IV. IMMUNITY LEGISLATION FOR FIREARMS SELLERS RESTS ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THE GUN INDUSTRY IS SHIELDED BY THE SECOND
AMENDMENT.
Section 2 of the Immunity Bill provides:
“The Congress finds the following: (1) Citizens have a right,
protected by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution,
83. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Accuracy in Assessment of Damages, 39 J. L. &
ECON. 191, 192 (1996); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be
Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 427-28
(1994) (tort and contract claims are based on harm to the injured party). Laurence Tribe argues that
guns are appropriate for self-defense. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at
901-02 n.221 (Foundation Press 2000); Laurence H. Tribe and Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated
Militias, and More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31.
84. Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 169-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d by Merrill v.
Navegar, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
85. Jacobs, supra note 45.
86. Id.
87. Lietzel supra note 81.
88. This calculation omits the $2.3 billion costs of treating gunshot victims, the costs of
increased police and gunfire cleanups, the gun-flight from the cities and the cost of the fear of being
shot. On the benefits side, it omits the benefit of feeling secure in the home because of a gun, the
thrill of hunting, the sport of shooting tin cans and paper targets. It also omits the value of gun
collecting and assumes that each of the 308 attackers would have killed the gun owner.
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to keep and bear arms.”
The Second Amendment states:
“A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.”89
Numerous articles have been written evaluating the Second
Amendment.90 Some authors take the position that individuals have the
right to keep and bear arms.91 Others argue that only a well-regulated
militia has the right to keep and bear arms.92 This section will provide
an overview of Second Amendment caselaw and manifest that there is
little basis for concluding that firearms sellers are constitutionally
immunized by the Amendment.
Gun proponents argue that the Second Amendment means that the
government may pass no laws that interfere with citizens purchasing and
keeping guns.93 The anti-gun theorists take the position that the Second
Amendment means merely that a militia may purchase and keep guns,
but not individual citizens, unless they are members of a militia.94 It is
therefore appropriate for the government to regulate the sale and
ownership of guns.95 Professor Herz suggests that the militia today
89. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
90. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 63; Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1141 (1996); Thomas J. Walsh, The Limits
and Possibilities of Gun Control, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 639 (1994).
91. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 793
(1998). The Court of Appeals, arguably in dicta, stated that the Second Amendment gives
individuals the right to “privately possess and bear their own firearms.” U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203, 236 (2001).
92. See, e.g., Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origin and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Jacobs, supra note 45, at 327.
93. Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control
Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 437 (1995) citing National Rifle Association v. Brady, No. 893345 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Gun control opponents have long argued that the amendment bars gun
control laws. In fact, they often couch their inflammatory rhetoric with calls to ‘protect the
constitutional right to own any gun.’ They have even claimed that the Constitution protects the
right of all Americans to own machine guns.”).
94. Id. at 438 (“The Second Amendment, a compromise between the anti-federalists and
federalists, was designed to preserve the ability of individual states to maintain state militias.”). See
also Armitai Etzioni & Steven Hellend, The Case for Domestic Disarmament, THE
COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop.disarm.html [hereinafter
Domestic Disarmament] (“The [Supreme] Court, looking at the Second Amendment as a whole, has
repeatedly ruled that it refers to the desire of the constitutional Framers to protect state militias from
disarmament by the federal government, not to protect the individual citizens against disarmament
by the states.”).
95. See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 557-58 (1991). See also Domestic Disarmament, supra
note 94 (“Never in history has a federal court invalidated a law regulating the private ownership of
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would be the National Guard.96 In fact, there is no organization that is
precisely equivalent to the militia that existed at the time of the drafting
of the Second Amendment.97 The decided law appears to be on the side
of the anti-gun theorists. No case has directly agreed with the pro-gun
argument that each citizen has a right to own whatever type of firearms
she wants, although there are some cases that can be argued to support
the concept of a militia.98
A detailed study of the history of the Second Amendment was
recently provided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United
States v. Emerson, decided in October of 2001, the majority carefully
examined the text of the Second Amendment and the history
surrounding its development:
[T]he amendment achieves its central purpose by assuring that the
federal government may not disarm individual citizens without some
unusually strong justification consistant with the authority of the states
to organize their own militias. That assurance in turn is provided
through recognizing a right (admittedly of uncertain scope) on the part
of individuals to possess and use firearms in the defense of themselves

fire-arms on Second Amendment grounds. Indeed, that the Second Amendment poses no barrier to
strong gun laws is perhaps the most well settled proposition in American constitutional law.”).
96. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 62, at 58 (“[C]ourts have consistently found that the Second
Amendment guarantees a right to bear arms only for those who are part of the ‘well-regulated
Militia’—today’s stateside National Guard.”).
97. Williams, supra note 94, at 590:
[T]hose who support an individual rights view of the Amendment are mistaken in
equating the people’s militia and the universe of private gun owners. For one thing, the
militia not only may be universal; it must be, because any smaller body would reflect
only a partial interest. The threat of corruption may lurk as much in insurrection by
private force as in governmental tyranny. Second, while the militia must not be
dominated by the state, it also must not be wholly private. Participation in the militia
gave citizens an education in civic virtue, prompting them to associate possession of
weapons with service to the republic. They also learned to be independent, but as a
political body devoted to the common good, not as private individuals. They were
independent not from the world, but from whatever forces were seeking at the moment to
corrupt the republic—whether state ministers or popular demagogues. Gun owners
today do not comprise a universal militia.
Id. The author argues that the “Militia” that was contemplated by the Framers was one in which
citizens shared the common interest of ensuring that the power remained with the people. Id. at
592-93. Since citizens today are driven largely by self-interest and have not united for the good of
the community, the Militia no longer exists. Id. at 593-594.
98. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J.
664-65 (1989) (discussing the various interpretations of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939)). Justice Garwood states, in dicta, that the Second Amendment gives individuals the right to
“privately possess and bear their own firearms.” The holding in a recent case, Emerson, however, is
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is constitutional in allowing the removal of a pistol from a divorced
physician who was said to pose a threat to his ex-wife. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (2001).
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and their homes.99

The Court then examined the recognized treatises of the 1800s and
concluded, “the great Constitutional scholars of the 19th century
recognized that the Second Amendment guarantees the right of
individual Americans to possess and carry firearms.”100 The narrow
holding of the case, however, is that a federal statute is constitutional in
authorizing the removal of a pistol from a physician who posed a threat
to his former wife.101
The leading case law supports the regulation of gun ownership. In
United States v. Miller,102 the defendants were arrested for carrying an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun.103 The National Firearms Act of 1934
required the weapon to be registered.104 Miller, decided in 1939 by the
United States Supreme Court, held that federal legislation prohibiting the
purchase and sale of sawed-off shotguns was “neither an
unconstitutional invasion of the reserve states authority guaranteed by
the Tenth Amendment nor did it infringe upon the right to keep and bear
arms as protected by the Second Amendment.”105 The Court held that
“Congress had the right to determine whether certain firearms would be
restricted in the interest of national public safety and whether those
weapons were appropriate for militia use.”106
An important case supporting the extensive regulation of firearms
ownership is Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.107 This 1982 Illinois
case dealt with a municipal ban on the sale and possession of

99. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236 (quoting Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
2000) v.1, note 221, at 902).
100. Id. at 256.
101. Id. at 261.
102. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
103. Id. at 175.
104. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 1132(d)):
Within sixty days after the . . . effective date of this Act every person possessing a
firearm shall register, with the collector of the district in which he resides, the number or
other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name, address, place where such
firearm is usually kept, and place of business or employment, and, if such person is other
than a natural person, the name and home address of an executive officer thereof . . . .
Id.
105. Jacobs, supra note 45, at 330. See also Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“In the absence of any
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel less than eighteen
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such an instrument.”).
106. Jacobs, supra note 45, at 330.
107. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Ill. 1981).
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handguns.108 The trial judge ruled that Morton Grove’s exercise of its
police power permitted the ban on handguns.109 The case was upheld on
appeal.110 The defendants requested review by the United States
Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied.111 The point of Quilici is that
in recent times, the United States Supreme Court has refused to review a
municipal ordinance that banned the sale and possession of handguns.
When the Supreme Court decides to enter the gun regulation fray,
its decisions are likely to be quite narrow and require a long gestation
period.112 The Court will not likely decide all issues surrounding
firearms in one or several cases. It is also appropriate to assume that the
Supreme Court will follow precedent and approve reasonable regulations
dealing with the sale and ownership of guns as it has in the past. Dicta
in United States v. Emerson is quite broad and suggests that every
person has a right to own a gun, but the Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in that case.113 The proposed immunity legislation, if it passes,
will have to pass muster before the United States Supreme Court and
precedent suggests it will likely fail.
V. CONCLUSION
The general rule for products liability is that all those who
participate in the marketing of defective products are subject to
liability.114 The House of Representatives reversed that rule for guns in
passing the gun sellers immunity bill.115 It wrongly assumed that guns
108. Id. at 1171. The ordinance provided in part that “no person shall possess, in the Village of
Morton Grove . . . (a)ny handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative.” Id.
The ordinance specified various limited exceptions for certain individuals, such as peace officers,
prison officials, members of the armed forces and national guard, licensed gun collectors, and
recreational users complying with specified requirements. Id.
109. Id. at 1179.
110. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982).
111. Id.
112. No Supreme Court case has squarely addressed the scope of the Second Amendment.
However, some cases have whittled away at the sweeping generalization that the Second
Amendment guarantees a right to bear arms without restriction. See supra note 236. See also
Quilici, 695 F.2d 261 (a ban on handgun possession was not a violation of Second Amendment
rights). U.S. v. Emerson could have provided the first meaningful test case. 270 F.3d 203, 260
(2001). An example of a long gestation period is the Supreme Courts treatment of punitive
damages. See, B.M.W. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
113. “We agree with the district court that the Second Amendment protects the right of
individuals to privately keep and bear their own firearms . . .” Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264, cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 907 (June 10, 2002).
114. See W.P. KEETON, D.B. DOBBS, & R.E. KEETON, D.G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 677-724 (1984).
115. See F.J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY 1-16 (1989).
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are essential to self-defense and, therefore, deserving of protection. The
House also mistakenly assumed that firearms sellers are clearly
immunized by the Second Amendment.
These two mistakes
substantially undermine the foundation of the Senate version of the Bill,
S. 659.
The Senate, in evaluating the firearms manufacturers’ immunity
bill, should consider the gun violence epidemic, the foundering of gun
cases in the state courts, and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Second Amendment. They should allow the courts to continue to
hammer-out gun policy over the next several years. Immunization of the
gun industry would be a rejection of more than 150 years of products
liability theory and fly in the face of the continuing widespread
shootings and deaths. The gun industry has an important role to play in
reducing gun violence, but they must be encouraged to participate in
developing the framework and details of the solution. This is not the
appropriate time for giving a pass to the recalcitrant gun industry.
Appendix A
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 659
To prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for
damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 19, 2003

Dear Colleague:
I am contacting you about . . . an immunity bill that is being considered by the U.S.
Senate that, if passed, would grant the gun industry unprecedented immunity from most
negligence and products liability cases, something no other industry in America enjoys.
The bill is retroactive; it would require the immediate dismissal of many pending cases,
such as the case brought by DC-area sniper victims against the gun dealer and
manufacturer whose negligence allegedly provided the snipers with their gun, as well as
many design defect claims where children and others are injured in unintentional
shootings because of defective guns. This legislation is a shocking departure from basic
tenets of tort law . . .
Letter from Heidi Li Feldman, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, to the author (June 20,
2003) (on file with the author). See also Keeton, supra note 114; F. Vandall, E. Wertheimer, M.
Rahdert, TORTS, CASES AND PROBLEMS 497-562 (2003).
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Mr. CRAIG (for himself, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. ALLARD,
Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BOND, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. BROWNBACK,
Mr. BUNNING, Mr. BURNS, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. CHAMBLISS, Mr.
COCHRAN, Mr. COLEMAN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. CRAPO,
Mrs. DOLE, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. ENZI, Mr.
FRIST, Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. GREGG, Mr.
HAGEL, Mr. HATCH, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr.
KYL, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. LOTT, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr.
MILLER, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Mr. NICKLES, Mr.
REID, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SHELBY, Mr.
SMITH, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. SUNUNU, Mr. TALENT, and
Mr. THOMAS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for
damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS- The Congress finds the following:
(1) Citizens have a right, protected by the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution, to keep and bear arms.
(2) Lawsuits have been commenced against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as
designed and intended, which seek money damages and other
relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third
parties, including criminals.
(3) The manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of
firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily
regulated by Federal, State, and local laws. Such Federal laws
include the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms
Act, and the Arms Export Control Act.
(4) Businesses in the United States that are engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design,
manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to
the public of firearms or ammunition that has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce are not, and
should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who
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criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or
ammunition products that function as designed and intended.
(5) The possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry
for harm that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the
legal system, erodes public confidence in our Nation's laws,
threatens the diminution of a basic constitutional right and
civil liberty, invites the disassembly and destabilization of
other industries and economic sectors lawfully competing in
the free enterprise system of the United States, and constitutes
an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of
the United States.
(6) The liability actions commenced or contemplated by the
Federal Government, States, municipalities, and private
interest groups are based on theories without foundation in
hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of
the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion
of the common law. The possible sustaining of these actions
by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury would expand civil
liability in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several
States. Such an expansion of liability would constitute a
deprivation of the rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed to a citizen of the United States under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(b) PURPOSES- The purposes of this Act are as follows:
(1) To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition
products for the harm caused by the criminal or unlawful
misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others
when the product functioned as designed and intended.
(2) To preserve a citizen's access to a supply of firearms and
ammunition for all lawful purposes, including hunting, selfdefense, collecting, and competitive or recreational shooting.
(3) To guarantee a citizen's rights, privileges, and immunities,
as applied to the States, under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, pursuant to section 5 of that
Amendment.
(4) To prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose
unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce.
(5) To protect the right, under the First Amendment to the
Constitution, of manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
importers of firearms or ammunition products, and trade
associations, to speak freely, to assemble peaceably, and to
petition the Government for a redress of their grievances.
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON BRINGING OF QUALIFIED CIVIL
LIABILITY ACTIONS IN FEDERAL OR STATE COURT.
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(a) IN GENERAL- A qualified civil liability action may not be brought
in any Federal or State court.
(b) DISMISSAL OF PENDING ACTIONS- A qualified civil liability
action that is pending on the date of enactment of this Act shall be
immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS- The term `engaged in
the business' has the meaning given that term in section
921(a)(21) of title 18, United States Code, and, as applied to a
seller of ammunition, means a person who devotes, time,
attention, and labor to the sale of ammunition as a regular
course of trade or business with the principal objective of
livelihood and profit through the sale or distribution of
ammunition.
(2) MANUFACTURER- The term `manufacturer' means,
with respect to a qualified product, a person who is engaged
in the business of manufacturing the product in interstate or
foreign commerce and who is licensed to engage in business
as such a manufacturer under chapter 44 of title 18, United
States Code.
(3) PERSON- The term `person' means any individual,
corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society,
joint stock company, or any other entity, including any
governmental entity.
(4) QUALIFIED PRODUCT- The term `qualified product'
means a firearm (as defined in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
section 921(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code), including
any antique firearm (as defined in section 921(a)(16) of such
title), or ammunition (as defined in section 921(a)(17) of such
title), or a component part of a firearm or ammunition, that
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
(5) QUALIFIED CIVIL LIABILITY ACTION(A) IN GENERAL- The term `qualified civil liability
action' means a civil action brought by any person
against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified
product, or a trade association, for damages resulting
from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified
product by the person or a third party, but shall not
include-(i) an action brought against a transferor
convicted under section 924(h) of title 18,
United States Code, or a comparable or
identical State felony law, by a party
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directly harmed by the conduct of which the
transferee is so convicted;
(ii) an action brought against a seller for
negligent entrustment or negligence per se;
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or
seller of a qualified product knowingly and
willfully violated a State or Federal statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of the
product, and the violation was a proximate
cause of the harm for which relief is sought;
(iv) an action for breach of contract or
warranty in connection with the purchase of
the product; or
(v) an action for physical injuries or
property damage resulting directly from a
defect in design or manufacture of the
product, when used as intended.
(B) NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT- In
subparagraph (A)(ii), the term `negligent
entrustment' means the supplying of a qualified
product by a seller for use by another person when
the seller knows, or should know, the person to
whom the product is supplied is likely to, and does,
use the product in a manner involving unreasonable
risk of physical injury to the person and others.
(6) SELLER- The term `seller' means, with respect to a
qualified product-(A) an importer (as defined in section 921(a)(9) of
title 18, United States Code) who is engaged in the
business as such an importer in interstate or foreign
commerce and who is licensed to engage in business
as such an importer under chapter 44 of title 18,
United States Code;
(B) a dealer (as defined in section 921(a)(11) of title
18, United States Code) who is engaged in the
business as such a dealer in interstate or foreign
commerce and who is licensed to engage in business
as such a dealer under chapter 44 of title 18, United
States Code; or
(C) a person engaged in the business of selling
ammunition (as defined in section 921(a)(17) of title
18, United States Code) in interstate or foreign
commerce at the wholesale or retail level, consistent
with Federal, State, and local law.
(7) STATE- The term `State' includes each of the several
States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the
United States, and any political subdivision of any such place.
(8) TRADE ASSOCIATION- The term `trade association'
means any association or business organization (whether or
not incorporated under Federal or State law) that is not
operated for profit, and 2 or more members of which are
manufacturers or sellers of a qualified product.
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